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Abstract
We are living in an era with an abundance of electronic data, yet the integrity and evidential value
of these data are very hard to check. At present the problems like affecting the 2016 presidential
elections in the USA or elections in the Europe by (social) media are highly topical. A few years ago
such activity seemed completely improbable but it is entirely possible using contemporary means of
data manipulation.  Big data analysis as well is constantly reaching wider masses. The processing of
sensitive genetic and health data has become an everyday issue. However, in order to ensure the
complete authenticity of these data, it is necessary to guarantee their evidential value by certifying
their initial source. 
The initial source can only be certified by adding a digital signature or seal to a document contain-
ing health data, which should be done as close to its source as possible. It means that we can later
rely on a medical document only if its compiler, the general practitioner,  has digitally signed it.  
Currently a major concern is that the format of electronic signing is changing and a large number of
documents in old format have to be signed again. Thus, a solution should be found to the highly
topical problem of how to ensure that the document has the original, unchanged evidential value
also many years later. 
Keywords: electronic health records, integrity, digital signature
CERCS: P170 Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control
Elektroonsete terviseandmete terviklikkuse tagamine
Lühikokkuvõte:
Me elame ajastul, kus meie käsutuses on väga palju andmeid, kuid samas on nende andmete õigsust
ja  tõestusväärtust väga  raske  kontrollida.  Nii  on  kasvõi  Eurooopas  või  Ameerikas  toimunud
valimiste  (sotsiaal)meedia  abil  mõjutamine  asjakohane  näide  -  aastaid  tagasi  ei  võidud  selle
võimalikkusest   mõeldagi,  tänapäevase  meedia  abil  aga  küll.  Samamoodi  hakkab  massidesse
jõudma big  data  analüüs.  Geeni-  ja  terviseandmete  töötlemine  on  muutunud igapäevaseks,  aga
selleks,  et  tulemusi  saaks  100%  õigeteks  pidada,  on  vajalik,  et  nende  andmete  
tõestusväärtus oleks algallikas kinnitatud.  Viimane on aga võimalik ainult  digitaalse allkirja või
templiga,  mis  on  antud  võimalikult  lähedal  algallikale  -  meditsiinidokument  peab  olema
allkirjastatud isiklikult  perearsti  poolt,  sest  ainult  nii  on võimalik seda tulevikus arvesse võtta.  
Hetkel  on  suureks  probleemiks  ka  asjaolu,  et  digitaalallkirjastamise  formaat  
on muutumas. Seetõttu oleks väga palju vanas formaadis digiallkirju vaja ümber teha ja ühtlasi
tagada, et hiljem on algse dokumendi tõestusväärtus sama, mis vastava dokumendi tegemise ajal. 
Võtmesõnad: elektroonsed terviseandmed, terviklikkus, digitaalne allkiri
CERCS:P170 Arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine (automaatjuhtimisteoo-
ria)
2
 
List of Abbreviations and Terms
BDOC binary document
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Federal Office for In-
formation Security)
CLUSIF Club de la Sécurité de l'Information Français
CSP certification service provider
DDOC digital document
DSG document digital signature
EHR electronic health record
EU European Union
GP general practitioner
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HITECH Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
HWISC Health and Welfare Information Systems Centre
IS information system
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ISKE Infosüsteemide Kolmeastmeline Etalonturbe süsteem (Three-level baseline 
security system)
ISMS Information Security Management Systems
ISSRM information systems security risk management 
IT information technology
KSI Keyless Signature Infrastructure
MEHARI Method for Harmonized Analysis of Risk
MSP medical service provider
NHIS National Health Information System
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
RRL risk reduction level
SRQ sub-research question
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1 Introduction
Medical records in some form or other are as old as medicine itself. As stated by Luo [1, p. 20], “A
medical record is an account of the patient’s presenting symptoms, with annotations from the physi-
cian and other health professionals detailing their observations as well as discussions with the pa-
tient”. In earlier times medical information of people was stored on paper in hand-written form. At
first every doctor took his own notes, which were inaccessible to others, but later on different data
pertaining to one person were collected together in one record. However, a major drawback of a pa-
per-based record is that it can be in only one place at a time and has to be taken from one medical
institution to other. Handwriting in such records is often poorly legible, which in turn may cause
misunderstandings and flaws in making decisions about the treatment of patients. With the advance-
ments  in  medicine  and  computer  technology an  idea  of  implementing  computer-based  medical
records arose in the late 1960s [2]. Patient’s health information in such records is stored in a digital
form and can be shared between different health care providers through network-connected infor-
mation systems. Electronic health records (EHRs) contain various medical data from all doctors
treating one and the same patient, but also laboratory test results, information on medication, aller-
gies, etc.  All data are stored in only one modifiable file, which largely facilitates extracting data
needed for the examination of a patient and making decisions about his/her health status and further
treatment.  Electronic health-care records must be preserved at  least  for the patient’s  lifetime or
much longer for academic research. 
However, as in the case of other kinds of information exchange via electronic channels, the EHRs
may also be affected by threats from hackers, malicious workers, third parties, vulnerabilities or
viruses – the information can be stolen,  modified or used in some other adverse way causing harm
to the patient. The increasing number of electronically stored medical records enhances also the
possibility of threats to our security and privacy [3]. Thus, one of the key problems is ensuring the
integrity of information, which is discussed in this master’s thesis.
The integrity problems are very intense in present-day shared infrastructure. The researh of the Eu-
ropean Union Agency for Network and Information Security about security and resiliance in e-
health has found out that, according to the EC Directive on Critical Infrastructures, healthcare ser-
vices have been recognized as a critical societal sector. Therefore, healthcare systems are considered
as critical infrastructures that should be protected from all types of threats, including cyber security
attacks [4]. However, many obstacles still need to be overcome “in the legal and semantic interoper-
ability, standardization or electronic identification domains” [5].
The main aim of this master’s thesis is to find out which methods can ensure the integrity of EHRs.
Legal and cyber security aspects are analysed on the example of Estonia, the USA and European
Union. The present state of the Estonian e-health infrastructure is considered. The business assets
and risk analysis of the assets in the Estonian e-health infrastructure are discussed. Great attention is
paid to security risk assessment, mitigation and control selection which are among the main issues
in securing the integrity of EHRs.
The thesis  is based on the assumption that the attributes of data authenticity, integrity and data
origin verifiability are preserved by digital signature. The information transmitted over a transfer
medium can be deliberately or accidentally modified, which may result in loss of data integrity. If
the digital signature is used on the health information side, any modification on the signed content
is immediately detectable [6].
To better understand cyber security challenges in the Estonian e-health infrastructure, the main fo-
cus of the thesis is on analysing the integrity of the EHRs. I chose the topic of the thesis due to my
personal experience in dealing with medical records containing sensitive data at the National Health
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Information System (NHIS) of Estonia. As very many EHRs from general practitioners (GPs) reach
the NHIS in digitally unsigned form, they are vulnerable to any unauthorized modification, which
may result in mistakes in patient treatment and may even have lethal consequences. In order to pre-
vent such irreversible damage, measures should be taken to increase the integrity of EHRs of thou-
sands of people, one of those measures being adding a digital signature to an EHR by the person or
organization who initially creates that document.
1.1 Problem Statement 
In Estonia, the NHIS is the main central state health information database managed by the Health
and Welfare Information Systems Centre (HWISC). Doctors, medical service providers (MSPs) and
GPs  or  health-care  service  providers  are  main  data  producers  and data  users.  Medical  service
providers  and  the  NHIS  are  connected  over  the  data  exchange  layer  named  X-Road.  General
practitioners do not use X-Road infrastructure due to the lack of financial instruments, technical
skills  or  infrastructure.  Information  systems of  GPs are  connected  with  the  NHIS over  a  mini
information portal which is managed by the HWISC. A digital signature or an e-seal added to an
EHR can ensure the integrity of this EHR. Due to the lack of skills of software developers, a GP
must  sign  every  record  manually.  Thus  GPs  are  not  satisfied  with  this  service  and  want  it
redesigned. The decision of the former Estonian E-health Foundation (present HWISC) committee
to allow GPs to send digitally unsigned documents to the NHIS creates a security risk to patients
data. Today GPs send out EHRs without a digital signature and the NHIS digitally signs them. This
procedure, however, may not be secure and may make the unsigned documents vulnerable.  The
digitally  unsigned  EHRs  are  vulnerable  to  theft,  unauthorized  alteration  or  misuse  during  the
transfer of patients’ medical data from the system used by GPs to the NHIS.  Due to the sensitivity
of the information that the health-care system is dealing with, security is one of the major concerns
that must be dealt with [7].
1.2 Research Methods
This thesis is a case study-based research relying on surveys and interviews. The current situation in
the  Estonian  e-health  infrastructure  is  analysed.  The focus  groups are  security  managers,  chief
information officers and GPs. The results are limited to Estonian context, as mainly persons from
Estonia participated in this study. The reliability of the results was improved by including external
experts in the process. The figures of the present thesis were compiled using Gliffy software and
symbols  in  the  standard  Business  Process  Model  and  Notation,  developed  by  the  Object
Management Group [8].  With the help of this standard, organizations can better understand and
manage their business processes in a graphical notation. 
1.3 Research Questions
The main research question of this thesis is:
How to guarantee the integrity of the EHR business process? 
The main research question is subdivided into the following sub-research questions (SRQ): 
SRQ1 – What assets are present in the Estonian e-health infrastructure?
SRQ2 – How to assess risks of assets in the Estonian e-health infrastructure?
SRQ3 – How to mitigate risks in the Estonian e-health infrastructure?
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To find an answer to the main research question, first the present situation of the Estonian e-health
infrastructure is described. Next the business and information system assets are analysed and the
ways how information system (IS) assets support business assets and security criteria are discussed.
Risk analysis of assets in the Estonian e-health infrastructure is provided, involving defining threat
agents, attack methods, vulnerabilities and impacts. The analysis also includes security risk mitiga-
tion,  risk assessment and control selection.
The results obtained in the study are validated through the survey that was conducted among spe-
cialists working in the E-health infrastructure. As the main question of my thesis is how to ensure
the integrity of EHRs, I prepared a questionnaire and drew conclusions based on the answers that I
received from the experts in the field of e-health. 
The first sub-research question (SRQ1) is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Several parties are oper-
ating in the Estonian e-health infrastructure through different ISs. By finding out how the responsi-
bilities are shared between these parties, it can be understood what kind of information is trans-
ferred through different parties and how its confidentiality, integrity and availability is secured in
different organizations. 
The second sub-research question (SRQ2) is discussed in Chapter 4. It is very important to under-
stand that the Estonian e-health infrastructure is not one organization but a much wider structure
consisting of several organizations and governmental institutions, which can all be affected by the
weaknesses of that system. 
The third sub-research question (SRQ3) is dealt with in Chapter 5. In the Estonian e-health infra-
structure some resources are shared but the organizations involved do not have the same security re-
quirements. For that reason, for example, the NHIS must follow the highest security standards in or-
der to ensure the integrity of EHRs. General practitioners, however, do not need to follow the same
security requirements, which may breach the integrity and reliability of documents created by them.
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2  Background
The main goal of this chapter is to give an overview of EHRs and to introduce risk management
frameworks. The following questions are tackled:
• What standards and methods are used to assess security risks related to EHRs?
• What is security risk management?
• What security risk standards could be used for an EHR? 
• What methods support the assessment of an EHR?
2.1 Description of EHRs
Electronic health-care records have different forms depending on their purpose, kind of information
stored, range of the information [9]. Among these, EHRs are widely used. According to the defini-
tion of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [10], an EHR is “a repository of pa-
tient data in digital form, stored and exchanged securely,  and accessible by multiple authorized
users. It contains retrospective, concurrent, and prospective information and its primary purpose is
to support continuing, efficient, and quality integrated health”. A patient’s EHR is a “shared, inte-
grated or interlinked (virtual) record of all his/her clinically relevant health and medical data inde-
pendent of when, where and by whom the data were recorded” [5, p. 5].
An EHR is a digital version of a patient’s paper-based medical chart. It is a real-time, patient-cen-
tred record which provides instant and secure information to authorized users. An EHR contains in-
formation from more than one health-care organization, such as laboratories, specialists, medical
imaging facilities, pharmacies, emergency facilities, etc. The information is shared between all clin-
icians involved in a patient’s care. The term “EHR” is widespread, but there exist also several other
terms for EHR: “electronic patient record”, “electronic medical record” and “computer-based pa-
tient record” [11]. The terms “electronic health record” and “electronic medical record” are often
treated as synonymous. However, the National Alliance for Health Information Technology, USA,
gives two different definitions, and differentiates also the personal health record [12]:
a) Electronic health record  – “An electronic record of health-related information on an individual
that conforms to nationally recognized interoperability standards and that can be created, managed,
and consulted by authorized clinicians and staff across more than one health care organization” [12,
p. 17].
b) Electronic medical record – “An electronic record of health-related information on an individual
that can be created, gathered, managed and consulted by authorized clinicians and staff within one
health care organization” [12, p. 16].
c) Personal health record – “An electronic record of health-related information on an individual that
conforms to nationally recognized interoperability standards and that can be drawn from multiple
sources while being managed, shared, and controlled by the individual” [12, p. 19].
Although great progress has been made in the use of EHRs, this process may be quite complicated.
The key factors affecting the adoption of electronic records are nation’s overall healthcare system,
the information technology (IT) status and strategies, national or regional approaches, connectivity
issues, and stages of implementation, as well as the governance, funding, public policy, and legal
and regulatory issues [13]. There is also resistance among doctors. Among many reasons brought
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out by Ajami and Bagheri-Tad [14] we could mention the need of extra time, cost, computer skills,
disruption of work flow, security issues, etc.
2.2 Benefits of EHRs
In comparison with paper-based medical records, EHRs have many benefits both for patients and
health service providers. They enable an effective flow of information, making it available when-
ever and wherever it is needed, thus contributing to the delivery of better medical care. The benefits
of EHRs have been widely discussed in medical circles in relation to the adoption of EHRs and are
thus also considered in numerous published papers and respective webpages ([11,15]).
The following main benefits of EHRs can be listed [15]:
1. Improved health care – providing convenience in health care transactions and reliable and quick
access to complete patient health information resulting in more coordinated and efficient care; en-
hanced decision support and medical information; real-time quality reporting, legible (unlike hand-
written reports, which are often difficult to read), complete documentation; interfaces with labs, reg-
istries and other EHRs; safer, more reliable prescribing and a possibility of e-prescriptions electroni-
cally sent to pharmacy; patient portals with online interaction for providers.
2. Increased patient participation and improved care coordination – patients can get accurate infor-
mation about their  medical evaluations, self-care instructions and reminders for other follow-up
care; appointment schedules can be made electronically and via e-mail, thus providing quick and
easy communication between patients and service providers, enabling earlier identification of dis-
ease symptoms and improved diagnostics and patient outcomes.
2.3 Security of EHRs
A major issue with the implementation of EHRs is protecting their integrity, which is extensively
covered in scholarly publications (see e.g. [16] and references therein) and webpages of different
health-related governmental and local institutions, organizations, etc. As any malevolent modifica-
tion of EHRs may cause great, sometimes irreversible damage to patient’s health, countries have
taken legal measures and issued regulations for ensuring the integrity of EHRs (e.g. [4,17–24]). The
primary necessity, however, is to ensure a safe transfer, maintaining and exchange of medical data
between institutions. For this purpose various methods have been implemented, including adding a
digital signature to an EHR. A digital signature is widely used in Estonia, who has long been in at
the forefront of digitizing medical services. 
In the European Union (EU) all e-health organizations are dealing with local Data Protection Acts
and European Union Data Protection directive stating that “Everyone has the right to the protection
of personal data” [25]. Currently Directive 95/46/EC [17] and Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA
[18] are used as legal framework in Europe. In January 2012, however, the European Commission
put forward its EU Data Protection Reform. The aim of the reform was to make Europe fit for the
digital age,  to simplify the regulatory environment for business and to establish a harmonized data
protection framework across the EU. The new rules are contained in the Regulation [19] and Direc-
tive [20] of the EU, which both will apply from May 2018. 
In the United States the release of health-care information is legally regulated by the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) adopted in 1996. The Privacy Rule of the HIPAA
[21] defines the information that needs to be protected as the data concerning patient’s health status,
the provision of healthcare or payment for healthcare. It also gives instructions about how and under
what circumstances protected health information can be disclosed. The use of such information for
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marketing, fundraising or research is only permissible under patient’s prior authorization in writing.
The Privacy Rule also provides patients with access to their medical records. 
The security of EHRs is regulated by the HIPAA Security Rule, which is aimed to protect all indi-
vidually identifiable health information created,  maintained or transmitted in electronic form by
health-care providers. The rule specifies three types of safeguards that need to be implemented for
this purpose [22]: (1) administrative (security management, security personnel, information access
management, workforce training and management, evaluation of security policies), (2) physical (fa-
cility access and control, workstation and device security) and (3) technical (access control, audit
controls, integrity controls, transmission security). 
The health data and more sensitive patient communication data are protected by the Health Informa-
tion Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, which widens the scope of pri-
vacy and security protections provided by the HIPAA. The Act contains incentives related to health-
care IT in general (e.g. creation of a national health care infrastructure) and specific incentives de-
signed to accelerate the adoption of EHR systems [26].  Cyber threats are graphically depicted in
Figure 1.
Nowadays the physical security of systems, firewalls, encryption technologies and access control
mechanism are used to maintain the security of data [27]. However, we can spend a huge amount of
finances and it is still not enough to prevent data breaches. The major cyber threats and security
challenges in e-health are: systems availability, lack of interoperability, access control and authenti-
cation, data integrity, network security and data loss. In Estonia we are using a personal code, which
is unique identification for every person. Every user is registered in the central authority, and the
user can obtain a smart card. Access to data in the Estonian e-health infrastructure is granted in the
case of therapeutic relationship. We must remember that the data integrity level is not the same as
the security level [28]. The network architecture and network equipment (switches, firewalls, secu-
rity patches, event logging systems, etc.) are not sufficient for the network security layer when we
are dealing with personal e-health data. In Estonia we are using the X-Road infrastructure which
gives an additional security level, between MSPs and the NHIS. 
2.4 Standards and Regulations 
Many standards are used in healthcare industry. The following main standards are regulating the
EHRs:
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Figure 1: Cyber threats and challenges [6]. 
• Health Level7 (HL7) Clinical Document Architecture  – Health Level Seven International
(HL7) is a not-for-profit standards developing organization founded in 1987. “Level Seven”
refers to the seventh level of the ISO seven-layer communication model for Open Systems
Interconnection to the application level [29];
• openEHR [30] – an open standard specification in the health informatics that describes how
to manage, store, retrieve and exchange health data in EHRs [31].
These standards help to structure and markup clinical information for exchange between clinicians.
From the security prospective the following standards must be followed by the organizations deal-
ing  with  EHRs:  ISO  18308:2011  [32],  ISO/IEC  JTC1/SC27  [33],  ISO/TC 215 [34].  The  most
important standard is ISO 18308:2011 “Health informatics – Requirements for an electronic health
record architecture” which is a set of technical and clinical standards for Electronic Health Record
Architecture. This standard supports the use and exchange of EHRs between different health sectors
and different countries [35].
2.5 Information Risk Management
Information is very valuable and important for private and state organizations, therefore it must be
treated with utmost responsibility. Information risk management is an essential part of nowadays
successful companies culture but its importance is often neglected by private companies as well as
state-owned organizations.   
According to Matulevičius [36, p. 17], “One important task during secure systems development is
to understand what assets need to be protected against which risks, and how these risks could be
mitigated by proposed security countermeasures”. Main parts of risk management are: risk identifi-
cation, risk assessment and risk prioritization.  The process of information risk management is de-
picted in Figure 2. 
It is a common belief that information security means protecting the information at our disposal
against cyber criminals. Yet, this issue needs to be considered from a wider aspect, involving also
the protection of information against different force majeure risks such as flooding, storms and
earthquakes. Information risk management in an organization should begin by implementing the
documentation establishing the procedures necessary for fulfilling that task. The administration of
the organization must initiate and control this process, and build up the procedure of monitoring ev-
eryday transactions. 
Monitoring is particularly important in an organization dealing with confidential health data of peo-
ple for securing the integrity of health data available in EHRs. When building up the new infrastruc-
ture from scratch, we can rely upon the Risk Management Framework. However, in situations with
a substantial legacy from old systems and infrastructure, the Risk Management Frameworks need to
be treated with caution. 
2.6 Security Risk Management Standards
The security of the IS and the management of the security system are essential issues for all organi-
zations who are interested to be successful. The easiest way of fulfilling the needs of IS security
management is keeping track of security standards. Nowadays numerous security risk management
standards are available, including different approaches to how and at what stage of the project to use
them. We can expect that organizations who are participating in the Estonian e-health infrastructure
have respectively planned, documented and functioning processes. 
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2.6.1 ISO/IEC 27005: Information Security Risk Management
The ISO/IEC 27005 standard [38] describes the information security risk management process and
its tasks. The second edition of the standard was published in 2011. This standard is based on the
general corporate or enterprise-wide risk management standard ISO 31000:2009 “Risk management
– Principles and guidelines”. The information security risk management process consists of the fol-
lowing stages: 
•  establishment of the risk management context, including the scope, compliance obligations
and methods to be used and relevant policies;  
• risk assessment – identifying, analysing and evaluating relevant information risks by consid-
ering the information assets, threats, existing controls and vulnerabilities and on that basis
determining the likelihood of security incidents or security incident scenarios and the “level
of risk”;
• risk treatment – several risk treatment tasks are needed to reach the best state in terms of
residual risk; the effectiveness of risk treatment depends directly on risk assessment;  
• risk acceptance – organization managers must accept residual risks;
• risk communication – sharing information with the stakeholders through the process; the
whole process should be clearly documented so that all participants understand it;
• risk monitoring and review – monitoring and reviewing risks, risk treatments, identification
and responding to changes.
The ISO/IEC 27005 information security risk management process is graphically depicted in Figure
3.
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Figure 2: Information risk management [37].
2.6.2 Information Security Risk Management Standard by the US National Institute of
Standards and Technology 
The Cybersecurity Framework of the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
founded in 1901 within the US Department of Commerce,  provides a framework and methodology
of computer security guidance for private sector organizations and for critical infrastructure in the
United States of America.  The first version of the NIST standard  was published by the NIST in
2014 [39]. The NIST framework has three main parts [40]: 
• The core – “a set of cybersecurity activities, desired outcomes, and applicable references
that are common across critical infrastructure sectors”; these allow for “communication of
cybersecurity activities and outcomes across the organization from the executive level to the
implementation/operations level”. The core consists of five components (functions) aimed at
managing cyber security risk: identify, protect, detect, respond and recover. Each function
has key categories and subcategories which are matched with existing standards, guidelines
and practices.
• The tiers – we can find them from companies outcomes, and they are related to companies
business needs.  The following tiers are distinguished:  tier 1: partial; tier 2: risk informed;
tier 3: repeatable; tier 4: adaptive.
• The profiles – the organizations current status and road map towards the NIST. 
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Figure 3: The ISO/IEC 27005 information security risk management process [38].
The standard NIST SP 800-30, entitled “Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Sys-
tems”, deals with the risk assessment procedure and provides a baseline for conducting effective
risk management. It proposes two complementary processes: “risk assessment” and “risk mitiga-
tion”. The “risk assessment” process has nine components: system characterization, threat identifi-
cation, vulnerability identification, control analysis, likelihood determination, impact analysis, risk
determination,  control  recommendation  and  results  documentation  [41].  The  “risk  mitigation”
process is composed of seven steps: prioritizing actions, evaluating recommended control options,
conducting cost benefit analysis, selecting controls, assigning responsibility, developing safeguard
implementation planning and implementing selected controls.
2.6.3 The  Risk  Management  Framework  by  the  German  Federal  Office  for
Information Security 
The IT-Grundshutz is a set of German standards issued by the German Federal Office for Informa-
tion Security (BSI) [42], containing methods, processes, procedures, approaches and measures for
information security. The IT-Grundshutz is composed of three standards: BSI Standard 100-1: Infor-
mation Security Management Systems (ISMS), BSI-Standard 100-2: IT-Grundshutz Methodology
and BSI-Standard 100-3: Risk Analysis based on IT-Grundschutz. Main parts of ISMS are:  plan-
ning the information security risk processes, implementing the policy for information security, per-
formance review in the information security process and eliminating discovered flaws and weak-
nesses. The participants in the ISMS are shown in Figure 4. 
2.7 Security Risk Management Methods
The CLUSIF (Club de la Sécurité de l'Information Français) study from 2004 found that more than
200  security  risk  management  methods  had  been  registered  [41].  These  methods  have  their
strengths but also weaknesses. There exist different conceptions and also lack of interoperability be-
tween methods. The selection of the proper method depends on the organization. However, more
than one method should be used to resolve the task of protecting the integrity of EHRs. 
2.7.1 Information System Security Risk Management Domain Model
According to Matulevičius [36, p. 17], “A domain model for information systems security risk man-
agement (ISSRM) is developed through a survey of security-related standards, security risk man-
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Figure 4: Components of the ISMS [43].
agement  standards,  and security  risk management  methods”.  Main parts  of  the ISSRM domain
model are the following concepts:
• asset-related – through this concept it is determined which organization assets must be pro-
tected. The assets can be divided into several parts, for example business assets or organiza-
tional assets;
• risk-related – definition of risk and components; 
• risk treatment – a conception of how to treat risk; it can be divided into four subcategories of
risk treatment: risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer and risk retention.
All concepts are related to each other. A Universal Modeling Language class diagram showing how
various risk components are linked to each other is represented in Figure 5.
The main advantage of ISSRM is that it facilitates communication between three main stakeholders
who are concerned with IS security: IS developers, organization managers and organization clients
[41]. Using the ISSRM approach, we can usually have three outcomes [41]: the improvement of IS
security, better management of decisions about IS security investments and assessing the level of
confidence, which is important for customers and partners. 
2.7.2 MEHARI
MEHARI (Method for Harmonized Analysis of Risk) is a free, open source risk analysis assessment
and risk management method established in 1996 by the CLUSIF, a French IS security professional
association. MEHARI is based on two older methods – MARION (Méthode d’Analyse de Risques
Informatiques Optimisée par Niveau) [45] and MELISA (Méthode d’Evaluation de la Vulnérabilité
Résiduelle des Systèmes d’Armement), which are not maintained any more [41]. MEHARI is like a
toolbox designed for security management, consisting of the following modules:
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Figure 5: ISSRM domain model [44].
1. Security stakes analysis and classification – analysing assets of an organization. It starts
from defining a malfunction value scale, identifying the main activities and their objectives.
On the next step the resources of the IS are classified through the identification of elements
and giving rankings from classification criteria (confidentiality, integrity, availability).
2. Evaluation guide for security services – assessing the security level of the IS and through
this finding out main weaknesses of the system. It helps to make protection plans.
3. Risk analysis guide – identifying critical risks and analysing the risk situations. 
MEHARI’s risk listings are illustrated in Figure 6.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter I first gave a brief description and overview of benefits of EHRs. Next I discussed
the problem of ensuring the security of EHRs, which is one of the major issues in health care. Nu-
merous standards and methods for assessing and managing the security risks related to EHRs are
available, some of which are dealt with in this chapter. I considered the following questions: 
1. What standards and methods are used to assess security risks related to EHRs?  – Risk man-
agement is a continuous, proactive and systematic process for assessing and managing Estonian e-
health infrastructure risks in line with the accepted risk levels to provide reasonable assurance for
achieving the stated project objectives. Many standards have been developed for information secu-
rity management, but no methods are presented for implementing them. The ISO/IEC 27005 stan-
dard provides a general framework for risk management, but even there is much freedom for inter-
pretation. 2. What is security risk management? – It is necessary to understand what assets need
to be protected and which measures could be applied to mitigate security-related risks. Main parts
of risk management are: risk identification, risk assessment and risk prioritization. 3. What security
risk standards could be used for an EHR? – Three standards were presented in this chapter: the
ISO/IEC 27005 standard, the NIST standard (issued by the US National Institute of Standards and
Technology) and IT-Grundshutz (a set of standards issued by the German Federal Office for Infor-
mation Security). 4.  What methods support the assessment of an EHR? – I discussed two risk
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Figure 6: Risk process [46].
management methods – ISSRM and MEHARI. The main advantage of ISSRM is that it facilitates
communication between IS developers, organization managers and organization clients. MEHARI
consists of three modules: security stakes analysis and classification, evaluation guide for security
services and risk analysis guide. It is a free, open source method of security management.
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3 Present E-health Infrastructure in Estonia 
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of assets and security threats in organizations who are
changing information in the Estonian e-health infrastructure. The assets are analysed and thereafter
the assets involved in the Estonian e-health infrastructure are identified. In this chapter I provide an
answer to SRQ1 – What assets are present in the Estonian e-health infrastructure? In the discussion
below I consider the following problems: 
• Which organizations take part in the Estonian e-health infrastructure and what is the respon-
sibility of different parties?
• What kind of ISs are involved?
• How is an EHR transferred in the Estonian e-health infrastructure?
3.1 NHIS Infrastructure in Estonia
As mentioned above, the National  Health Information System (NHIS) is  the main central  state
health  IS  in  Estonia.  It  is  managed  by  the  Health  and  Welfare  Information  Systems  Centre
(HWISC). The task of the NHIS is to collect medical data from the respective service providers, to
store these data and enable their accessibility. The greatest group of data producers and receivers
consists in other medical service providers (MSPs) who use this information in making decisions
about the treatment of patients. The second biggest group of users is patients who examine their
electronic health records in the patient portal. The data collected by the NHIS must comply with the
security measure HT.34 of the instructions of  ISKE (in Estonian  Infosüsteemide Kolmeastmeline
Etalonturbe  süsteem),  a three-level IT baseline security system that has been developed for the
Estonian public sector, and the NHIS must guarantee their integrity. The obligation of transmitting
data into the NHIS by MSPs has been laid down in the Health Services Organisation Act (adopted
on 09 May 2001) [47], Statutes of the Health Information System (adopted on 14 August 2008) [48]
and Decree No. 53 “Health Information System transmitted data of documents and their storage
conditions and the procedure” of the Minister of Social Affairs of 17 September 2008 [49].
According to Article 2 of the statutes of the NHIS, a health IS is a set of data belonging to the
national IS. Provision 1 of Article 1 of the Security Measures for the Information Systems Act (No.
252, adopted 20.12.2007) [50] establishes that a system of security measures is applied to all ISs
and related information software that  are  used  to  process  data  contained in  state-level  or  local
databases. The parties of the Estonian E-health infrastructure are presented in Table 1.    
               
Medical service providers send data to the NHIS and also receive data. Data exchange between the
MSPs and the NHIS takes place via X-Road, the data exchange layer for ISs. Medical services are
provided by large hospitals as well as small centres of GPs. The IT solutions used by them, how-
ever, are different. The logical scheme of the Estonian E-health infrastructure is presented in Figure
7.  The GPs  and doctors  are  using  different  software  provided by MSP software  developers  or
portals developed by HWISC developers for sending and receiving medical information. The MSP’s
software and GP’s software can change information over the X-Road infrastructure or over the Mini
information system portal. Citizens can see medical information of them and their relatives through
the patient portal and can also share rights to their relatives. 
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Table 1: Parties of the Estonian e-health infrastructure.
Patient The person whose data are entered into the electronic health
record, stored and processed
General practitioner A  doctor  with  required  training,  practising  in  general
medicine, not in any specific branch of medicine, treating
patients of all ages, collecting information and creating elec-
tronic health records 
Doctor A doctor with required education and skills, practicing in a
special branch of medicine, collecting information and cre-
ating electronic health records
Medical service provider Organization providing medical services
National Health Information System Health and Welfare Information Systems Centre
Medical software developer The company developing the software used by general prac-
titioners or other doctors
Ministry of Social Affairs The Ministry directing, controlling and funding medicine in
Estonia
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Figure 7: Estonian e-health infrastructure.
3.2 Digital Signature in Estonia
The Digital Signatures Act, adopted by the Parliament of Estonia on 8 March 2000, establishes that
the digital signature is equivalent to the hand-written signature [51,52]. The digital and the hand-
written signature must be equally valid in the private as well as in the public sector. The Digital Sig-
natures  Act also regulates the activity of the Certification Service Provider (CSP) in Estonia. The
CSP in Estonia is the company SK ID Solutions AS.  According to the Act, the CSP is obliged to
provide the control of the validity of certificates. The following protocols are used: Certificate Re-
vocation List – a shared list of suspended and revoked certificates (for description see [53]), Light-
weight Directory Access Protocol – includes all valid certificates (see [54]), Online Certificate Sta-
tus Protocol (OCSP) – the most used service offered by the CSP [55]. 
3.3 Usage of Digital Signatures with EHRs
Ink-based signatures have long been part of he documentation process in health care [56], but the
use of digital signatures is gaining importance. The Document Digital Signature (DSG) Content
Profile is a technical integration framework issued by the Integrating Health-care Enterprise. The
DSG defines general methods of the use of the digital signature with EHRs. There are three types of
digital signatures: (1) an enveloping signature – document contains both the signature block and the
content, (2) a detached signature – this approach includes only references to the signed content and
(3) a submission set signature – manifest of all the other documents included in the submission set.
3.4 Security Assets of the Estonian E-health Infrastructure
The  NHIS  must  also  fulfil  the  requirements  set  by  ISKE.  The  first  version  of  the  ISKE
implementation manual was completed in 2003, but it has been repeatedly revised later [57]. The
NHIS has been assigned the integrity level T3. It means that the evidential value of data must be
confirmed by a digital signature, whereas the signer is responsible for the accuracy of data. The
integrity level T3 requires ensuring the evidential value of data (including documents sent to the
NHIS by MSPs).  Among other  things,  the  independent  evidential  value  for  all  other  interested
parties must be guaranteed. A most secure way to achieve it is to use a digital signature, as laid
down in the security measure HT.34 of the present ISKE. If it is not possible to employ a digital
signature, the three-level IT baseline security system requires using alternatives (security measures),
which must ensure functionally equal integrity. Government Regulation No. 273 of 12 August 2004
[58]  makes  ISKE  compulsory  for  state  and  local  government  organizations  dealing  with
databases/registers. 
However, the requirement of ISKE is not clearly worded and thus there are different possible inter-
pretations as to who must sign a document and why. From the register we can see that this require-
ment can be met in at least two ways: (1) the data are signed by their source when the data are en-
tered into the register and (2) the data are signed by the keeper of the register when the data are en-
tered into the register. 
The former way is  more suitable  for the register keepers because it  lowers their  responsibility.
When the other way is used, the register keeper must take additional measures in order to prove
why a certain entry was made. Still, besides fulfilling the ISKE requirement, the register keeper’s
signature has another function – it shows that the data were not altered between their entry into the
register and sending out from the register.
The ISKE requirements can be satisfied in either way, yet, the outcome is different. The NHIS is
currently using the former way – all data entered into the register by an MSP are provided with a
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digital signature or an e-seal. By fulfilling the ISKE requirement, also the actual security problem is
solved.  The  application  of  the  second way  does  not  contribute  to  the  solution  of  the  security
problem (proving the source of data) but is used solely for satisfying the ISKE requirement.  
In principle a similar scheme exists between MSPs. However, differences occur between big and
small MSPs, and dentists. 
3.5 Information Exchange in the Estonian E-health Infrastructure
Processing patient personal data in the MSP: When the patient arrives at the MSP, the registrar
collects different personal data: the patient’s name, address, phone number, e-mail address,  rela-
tionships and submits these data to the MSP database. Personal data are very valuable for the patient
and also for the MSP and constitute a very important business asset. The personal information about
the patient is contained in the data object called registered patient personal information business as-
set  which is supported by two system assets: the input interface used by the registrar to submit the
data and the database, where the registered patient data are stored. Here we have an additional sys-
tem asset, the MSP computer network that we can call the transmission medium through which the
registrar can submit registered patient information from the input interface to the MSP database.
The security criterion of this business asset is the confidentiality of patient registered data. Table 2
provides an overview including the registration of patient data by the MSP registrar and the busi-
ness asset – registered patient personal information, also the process of patient registration in the
MSP. The security criterion is the confidentiality of patient personal information, for example, the
address is important only for persons who need to know it. 
Table 2: Registered patient personal information asset identification.
Business asset 1 Registered patient personal information
IS assets Patient registration process;
Patient management;
Patient;
MSP network;
Registrar
Process description: 
how do IS assets support 
business asset(s)
Patient registration process:
• Patient goes to the registrar
• Patient provides an identification document 
• Patient provides personal data
• Patient pays for the visit
Security criterion Confidentiality of patient registration data
Processing patient health information: This data object is generated during the patient’s visit to
the GP. The respective document contains data about the patient, all personal information and also
information about the clinical data that were found during the visit. The creation of patient health
information represents the IS asset which supports the business assets  patient health information
and clinical data about the registered patient. A malevolent attacker, however, may be able to ma-
nipulate the patient medical data and thus change patient clinical information.
The process described in Table 3 shows how the patient goes to the GP and how the patient health
information is generated. It starts with clinical observation of the patient and finishes with compil-
ing the patient health information and transferring it to the NHIS. The most important aspect related
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to this process is guaranteeing the integrity and confidentiality of the patient health information pro-
vided by the GP.
Table 3: General practitioner compiling patient health information. 
Business asset 2 Patient health information
IS assets Creation of patient health information;
Sending patient health information;
Infrastructure
Process description: 
how do IS assets support 
business asset(s)
Creation of the EHR by the GP:
• Patient comes to the GP office
• GP makes observations
• GP starts compiling patient health information
• GP finishes patient health information
Security criteria Confidentiality of patient health information;
Integrity of patient health information
 
Sending the EHR created by the GP without a digital signature to the NHIS: After the patient
has visited the GP and the GP has created the EHR information, the following assets lie in the ex-
change of data between the MSP and NHIS. Table 4 shows how the EHR is created by the GP and
transferred to the NHIS. The main security criterion in this process is the integrity of the EHR. If
the EHR is not digitally signed when composed, it is possible to change data during the transport
process.
Table 4: EHR transfer to the NHIS asset identification.
Business asset 3 EHR information
IS assets Sending the EHR to the NHIS; 
Digital signature; 
Infrastructure
Process  description:
how do IS assets support
business asset(s)
Sending the EHR to the NHIS by the GP:
• GP creates the EHR
• GP sends the EHR to the NHIS
• NHIS receives the EHR
• NHIS makes validity controls
• NHIS saves the EHR to the database
Security criteria Confidentiality of the EHR;
Integrity of the EHR
Processing the EHR signed with an e-seal of the MSP: Medical service providers use their own
ISs into which doctors insert the data contained in EHRs provided by them. Before the EHR infor-
mation is sent to the NHIS, these are digitally signed in the IS of the MSP using the MSP’s e-seal.
Next the data are sent from one MSP to another, via the X-Road infrastructure. The X-Road infra-
structure signs all the outgoing messages and the X-Road infrastructure of the HWISC archives the
incoming messages into the cryptographically protected log (see Table 5). 
The use of the e-seal is justified due to the necessity of meeting the requirements set by ISKE. The
NHIS has been assigned the highest integrity level. In that case ISKE requires that the data be pro-
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vided with a digital signature or an e-seal ensuring their evidential value. The data are transferred
between two MSPs over the X-Road infrastructure. One MSP sends a query over X-Road and the
other MSP receives this query over the X-Road infrastructure. In between, the query passes through
three security servers. A digital trace about this process should be left in each server and the meta-
data of the query are additionally saved in the central server of the Information System Authority.
Table 5: Transfer of an EHR from the MSP to the NHIS.
Business asset 4 EHR information
IS asset MSP infrastructure
Process description: 
how do IS assets support 
business asset(s)
Sending the EHR to the NHIS by the MSP:
• MSP creates the EHR
• IS of the MSP adds an e-seal 
• MSP  sends  the  EHR  to  the  NHIS  through  the  X-Road
infrastructure
• NHIS receives the EHR
• NHIS makes validity controls
• NHIS saves the EHR to the database
Security criteria Confidentiality of the EHR; 
Integrity of the EHR
3.6 Requirements on Ensuring the Integrity of EHRs
Data integrity is the assurance that the data involved are accurate, consistent and up-to-date. It must
be ensured that the data are authentic and not affected by unauthorized changes. According to ISKE,
security level T3 of integrity requires that the information source, its change and destruction must
have evidential value; it is necessary to check that the data are correct, complete and up-to-date in
real time. The requirements of ISKE applying also to the NHIS, and which are audited, state that the
digital signatures and/or digital seal, meeting the requirements established in the Digital Signatures
Act of Estonia [51] can be applied to separate data, whole databases, etc. However, it is up to the
NHIS to decide which evidential value its data must have and on this basis to judge either to use the
person’s digital signature or an e-seal. It is forbidden to use the digital signature with the data and
documents of evidential value (security level T3) which do not comply with (in particular concern-
ing the infrastructure) the requirements established in the Digital Signatures Act of Estonia. Techni-
cal data and metadata can be left without a digital signature or an e-seal. 
3.7 Problems and Risks Related to EHRs Signed with an e-Seal
If the GP does not add a digital signature to an EHR, which would prove the authenticity of data,
the e-seal is attached to it in the system of the NHIS. Thus the requirements of ISKE are formally
fulfilled. In addition, this enables sending out digitally signed data to the GP. An e-seal is an alterna-
tive to X-Road, making it possible to verify that the data sent out by the NHIS correspond to the
data that were once saved in the NHIS database. The application of the e-seal by the NHIS requires
also changing the contracts made between the service providers. 
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3.8 Summary
This chapter gave an overview of assets and security threats in organizations who are changing in-
formation in the Estonian e-health infrastructure. In the analysis main attention was paid to identify-
ing assets in the Estonian e-health infrastructure. The following aspects were considered: 
1. Which organizations take part in the Estonian e-health infrastructure and what is the re-
sponsibility of different parties? – I defined seven parties: patients, GP, doctor, MSP, NHIS, medi-
cal software developer and Ministry of Social Affairs. 2. What kind of ISs are involved? – There
are ISs used by the MSP and developed by different companies, X-Road infrastructure, portals man-
aged  by  the  HWISC  and  the  NHIS  database  managed  by  the  HWISC. 3.  How  is  an  EHR
transferred in the Estonian e-health infrastructure?  – The EHRs created by doctors using the
MSP’s IS are sent over the X-Road infrastructure to the NHIS database, where all needed validation
and controls are done.
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4 Risk Analysis of Assets in the Estonian E-health Infrastructure
This chapter deals with SRQ2 – How to assess risks of assets in the Estonian e-health infrastruc-
ture? The analysis provides answers to the following questions:
• What are the threat agents in the Estonian e-health infrastructure?
• What kind of vulnerabilities are affecting organizations in the Estonian e-health infrastruc-
ture?
• What kind of attack methods can be used against organizations participating in the Estonian
e-health infrastructure?
• What are risk impacts for the organizations involved?
Below, the ISSRM Domain Model is applied to the analysis of security risks identified in issuing
EHRs by GPs and MSPs and sending them to the NHIS, and to the management of patient personal
data in the MSP local network. An answer to the question about ensuring EHR integrity is obtained.
The security modelling languages are assessed by using the three concepts of the ISRM domain
model [41]: assets-related, risk-related and risk treatment-related concepts.
Among other aspects, the information dealt with gives an insight into the interested parties, possible
threat agents, attack vectors, motivation of the attackers, etc. I try to find out how the threat agent is
able to carry out the attack method. Further I identify vulnerabilities and the impact of the attack.
Using this information it is possible to describe the ways how the interested parties can attack the
Estonian e-health infrastructure. 
4.1 Analysis of the Risk to the Registered Patient Personal Information Asset
One possible way (including threat agents, the attack method, risk components) of attacking and
misusing registered patient personal information is described in Table 6.
Table 6: Registered patient personal information – risk and threat analysis.
Risk 1
Threat agent Hacker
Motivation: needs patient personal information 
Resources: access to the network
Expertise: knows how to find information
Attack method Attacker gets access to the IS of the MSP
Attacker changes patient personal information
Vulnerability Weakness in the MSP network 
Impact Loss of trust in the MSP. Loss of confidentiality of patient information. Patient
information is stolen 
Risk 1 Hacker  uses  information  to  pretend  to  be  anybody  else,  or  to  sell  private
information to  interested persons. Loss of network security 
28
 
4.2 Analysis of the Risk to the Patient Health Information Asset
One possible way of attacking the patient health information business asset, where an MSP worker
is the threat agent, is presented in Table 7. The attack method and related risk components of EHR
information assets are described.
Table 7: Patient health information – risk and threat analysis.
Risk 2
Threat agent MSP worker 
Motivation: to get access to patient health information and to change it
Resources: access to the GP’s personal computer
Expertise: knowledge about the GP’s work process is built up 
Attack method Changing patient health information
Sending changed patient health information to the NHIS
Vulnerability Weakness in the MSP’s IS 
Impact     Loss of the integrity of patient health information.
    Negation of the integrity of the EHR
    Loss of trust in the MSP
Risk 2 MSP worker  changes  patient  health  information,  and  thus  the  diagnosis,
causing risk to person’s life
4.3 Analysis of the Risk to the EHR Information Asset Created by the GP
In this chapter the risks affecting the EHR information during its transfer from the GP to the NHIS
are described (Table 8). There is one threat agent, the hacker. 
Table 8: EHR created by the GP – risk and threat analysis.
Risk 3
Threat agent Hacker
Motivation: changing the EHR information during the transfer
Resources: access to the network
Expertise: network hacking
Attack method Hacker gets access to the network 
Vulnerability Weakness in the MSP’s health IS
Impact      Hacker gets access to the patient EHR and can change the diagnosis 
Risk 3 Hacker changes the diagnosis, which causes loss of integrity of the EHR and
poses risk to person’s life through wrong treatment
We can see from Table 8 that the goal of the hacker is to compromise and change the EHR in the
site where the person’s health record is stored. Through the network attack and expert knowledge in
this area it is easy for the hacker to make changes in the EHR because the integrity of the EHR is
not ensured when it is created. 
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This attack is possible because the GP does not add the digital signature to the EHR. The e-seal will
only be added to the EHR in the NHIS, and thus the NHIS stores the changed EHR with wrong
health data, bearing the e-seal of the NHIS. The next party asking for this information does not sus-
pect that this document was changed during its transfer from the GP to the NHIS database. 
4.4 Analysis of the Risk to the EHR Information Asset Created by the MSP 
In this chapter the risks affecting the EHR information during its transfer from the MSP to the NHIS
are described (Table 9). There is one threat agent, the hacker. 
Table 9: EHR created by the MSP – risk and threat analysis.
Risk 4
Threat agent Hacker
Motivation: changing the EHR information in the MSP infrastructure
Resources: access to the MSP infrastructure
Expertise: knowledge of hacking computers 
Attack method Hacker gets access to the MSP computers
Hacker changes the EHR
EHR is changed before the MSP provides the e-seal
Vulnerability Weakness in the transfer media
Impact      Hacker gets access to the patient EHR and can change the diagnosis 
Risk 4 Hacker changes the diagnosis, causing loss of the integrity of the EHR and
posing risk to person’s life through wrong treatment
Table 9 shows that the goal of the hacker is to compromise and change the EHR in the site where
the person’s health record is stored. Using the network attack and expert knowledge in this area, the
hacker can easily make changes in the EHR because the integrity of the EHR is not ensured when it
is compiled. 
This attack is possible because the MSP does not put a digital signature on the EHR during creating
the EHR. The e-seal will be added to the EHR only when the MSP sends the EHR to the NHIS, and
thus the NHIS stores the altered EHR with wrong health data, bearing the e-seal of the MSP. The
next party asking for this EHR does not suspect that this EHR was changed after compiling it in the
MSP infrastructure.
4.5 Summary
This chapter provided answers to the following questions. 1. What are the threat agents in the Es-
tonian e-health infrastructure? – Two possible threat agents are (a) a hacker and (b) another MSP
worker. 2. What kind of vulnerabilities are affecting organizations in the Estonian e-health in-
frastructure? – Four major vulnerabilities were defined: (a) weakness in the MSP network, (b)
weakness in the MSP’s IS, (c) weakness in the MSP’s health IS, (d) weakness in the transfer media.
3. What kind of attack methods can be used against organizations participating in the Esto-
nian e-health infrastructure? – The following attack methods are possible: (a) a hacker gets ac-
cess to the network through the man-in-the-middle attack, (b) an MSP worker changes patient medi-
cal information or sends changed patient medical information to the NHIS, (c) a hacker gets access
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to the network through weakness in the MSP’s health IS, (d) a hacker gets access to the MSP com-
puters and changes the EHR or the EHR is changed before the MSP adds the e-seal. 4. What are
risk  impacts  for  the  organizations  involved?  –  The  risk  impacts  include  (a)  loss  of  the
confidentiality of patient information or theft  of patient information,  (b) loss of the integrity of
patient medical information and negation of the integrity of the EHR, (c) changing the patient EHR
and the diagnosis by the hacker, (d) loss of trust in the MSP. 
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5 Security Risk Mitigation, Risk Assessment and Control Selection
This chapter deals with security controls and evaluation of risks in the Estonian e-health infrastruc-
ture. The analysis provides an answer to SRQ3 of the thesis – How to mitigate risks in the Estonian
e-health infrastructure? 
Some resources are shared in the Estonian e-health infrastructure but the organizations involved do
not have the same security requirements. For that reason, for example the NHIS must follow very
high security standards in order to ensure the integrity of EHRs. General practitioners, however, do
not need to meet the same security requirements, which may breach the security and reliability of
documents issued by them. Below, the following problems related to security requirements set on
the Estonian e-health system and the security controls that can be implemented to satisfy these re-
quirements are discussed:
• What are the security requirements for the Estonian e-health system?
• What kind of security controls can be implemented to fulfil the security requirements?
• What security controls should be applied in order to fulfil the security requirements for in-
tegrity, availability and confidentiality set on the HNIS by the law? 
5.1 Security Risk Mitigation
The risks identified in Chapter 4 can be managed and mitigated by applying security requirements
and controls. An overview of security controls and requirements enabling the reduction of risks to
an acceptable level is given in Table 10. 
Table 10: Security requirements and controls.
Risk Security requirement Control description
Risk 1 Monitoring and logging the activity in
the  MSP  network  and  personal
computers
Using  secured  connections  and  encryption
of  the  database  for  patient  registration.
Auditing database queries logs 
Risk 2 Monitoring and logging the activity of
MSP workers
Using stronger passwords or smart cards for
authentication
Risk 3 Ensuring the integrity of the EHR when
the GP creates it 
Using  the  digital  signature,  digital  seal  or
KSI time stamp when creating the EHR 
Risk 4 Ensuring the integrity of the EHR when
the MSP creates it
Verifying  the  received  EHR  with  the
previous original received (with Blockchain
cryptographic digest)
As seen from Table 10, the following security requirements are needed to reduce risks:
Risk 1 – monitoring and logging the activity in the MSP network and personal computers. In order
to satisfy this security requirement, we must apply control. This security control needs additional
technical staff and servers for logging and analysis of logs. Risk treatment cost to ensure this control
is 3.
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Risk 2 – monitoring the activity of MSP workers. For this purpose a stronger password and authenti-
cation with a smart card are applied. Risk treatment cost to ensure this control is 4.
Risk 3 – ensuring the integrity of the EHR when the GP compiles it. To achieve this, a digital signa-
ture, an e-seal or Keyless Signature Infrastructure (KSI) time stamp must be used on creating the
EHR. Risk treatment cost to ensure this control is 5.
Risk 4 – ensuring the integrity of the EHR when the MSP compiles it. To this end, the received EHR
must be verified with the previous original received. Risk treatment cost to ensure this control is 5.
To mitigate security risks, we must take various countermeasures depending on the character of
risk. For Risk 1 we must use a security network and up-to-date network equipment. All equipment
must be configured by employing strong passwords and keys, which makes it difficult for hackers
to log in. Strong passwords and keys are necessary on network devices, personal computers and
software. The software of the MSP IS must be tested against security requirements before imple-
menting it and all vulnerabilities must be repaired before using it in the production. In the case of
Risk 2 the MSP infrastructure must use a personal computer with the latest security patches in-
stalled, and employ a complex password or card for authentication. Mitigation of Risk 3 involves
using security network protocols and up-to-date network equipment with all security patches in-
stalled. All equipment must be configured using strong passwords and keys, so that hackers cannot
log in easily. The digital signature of the GP attached to the EHR is also a very good countermea-
sure preventing this document from malevolent modification. For Risk 4 it is necessary to use secu-
rity network protocols, install all security patches, and employ a complex password or card for au-
thentication. Here as well the digital signature of the GP is a very good countermeasure against
changing the EHR.
5.2 Security Risk Assessment
I conducted interviews with experts in the area of e-health infrastructure security. The following risk
components were estimated: business asset value, threat likelihood, vulnerability level and security
objectives, in the range from 0 to 5. The minimum risk obtainable is 0, and the maximum risk ob-
tainable is 45. It means that 0 and 45 represent the boundaries of the risks. The following formulas
were used for calculations [59]:
Risk event = threat likelihood + vulnerability level – 1 
Impact = maximum value of the security criterion
Risk level = risk event x impact level
Maximum risk = (5 + 5 – 1) x 5 = 45
Minimum risk =  (0 + 0 – 1) x 0 = 0
Risk reduction level = Risk level 1 – Risk level 2
The collected data are presented in Table 11.  The table  provides information about the risk levels
before and after applying security controls. 
It is difficult to mitigate all security risks, because this needs substantial resources and finances. By
applying the security control selection, we can find out which risks must be mitigated first.
33
 
Table 11: Risk metrics before and after risk treatment.
Before risk treatment After risk treatment Risk
reduc-
tion
level
Business
asset
value
Cost of
counter-
measureVulner-ability
level
Threat
likeli-
hood
Event
poten-
tiality
Impact
level
Risk
level
 1
Vulner-
ability
level
Threat
likeli-
hood
Event
poten-
tiality
Risk
level
 2
Risk 1 3 2 4 3 12 2 1 3 9 3 2 3
Risk 2 3 4 6 3 18 1 3 4 12 6 3 2
Risk 3 4 2 5 4 20 1 1 2 8 12 4 4
Risk 4 5 2 6 4 24 1 1 2 8 16 5 5
5.3 Security Control Selection
It is very difficult to mitigate all security risks due to the lack of resources, time, etc. In order to
choose security controls, we must have an excellent knowledge of the IS, it means we must know
what security controls should be selected in first order. To do this trade-off analysis, we used the
value of the business asset, countermeasure cost and the risk reduction level (RRL) – the informa-
tion available in the three last columns of Table 11. On the basis of this information three graphs
were prepared, including data on the RRL and business asset value, the RRL and countermeasure
cost, and the countermeasure cost and business asset value. Figure 8 represents a graph about the
RRL against business asset value. The desired situation is a high-value asset with a high risk reduc-
tion value. Such risks are observed in the quadrant with Risk 3 (R3) and Risk 4 (R4), representing
high priority.
The medium-priority quadrants have a low business asset value and low RRL, determined for Risk
1 (R1) and Risk 2 (R2). Figure 9 shows a graph of the RRL against the cost of countermeasures. An
ideal situation is characterized by a low cost value with a high risk reduction value. Risk 3 (R3) in
the figure represents medium priority. The medium-priority quadrants have a high cost value with a
high RRL and a low cost with low risk reduction values. This situation is seen in quadrants that
comprise Risk 4 (R4) and Risk 3 (R3), and Risk 1 (R1) and Risk 2 (R2), respectively. 
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Figure 8: Risk reduction level against business asset value.
Risk Reduction Level
Figure 10 depicts the cost of the countermeasure against business asset value. Medium priority is
observed in the quadrants combining high-value assets with a high cost of the countermeasure and
low-value assets with a low cost of the countermeasure (respectively in the quadrant comprising
Risk 3 (R3) and Risk 4 (R4), and in the quadrant with Risk 1 (R1) and Risk 2 (R2)). The ideal situa-
tion is a low-value asset with a high cost of risk treatment (in the quadrant with Risk 3 (R3) and
Risk 4 (R4)).
Table 12 presents the risk priorities derived from the graphs in Figures 8–10. Value 1 is assigned to
low-priority risks, value 2 to medium-priority risks and value 3 to high-priority risks. Adding these
values across the three graphs, a priority can be estimated that depends on the value of the business
asset, cost of countermeasures and RRL. Risks R3 and R4 are high-priority risks and R1 and R2 are
medium-priority risks. 
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Figure 9: Risk reduction level against the cost of the countermeasure.
Figure 10: Cost of the countermeasure against the business asset value.
Risk Reduction Level
Table 12: Risk versus priority.
Value–RRL RRL–cost Value–cost
Graph 1 Graph 2 Graph 3
Risk 1 1 2 2 5 Medium priority
Risk 2 2 1 1 4 Medium priority
Risk 3 3 3 3 9 High priority
Risk 4 3 3 3 9 High priority
5.4 Summary
The discussion presented in this chapter focuses on mitigating risks in the Estonian e-health envi-
ronment. The risk reductions that could be achieved were considered through the estimated calcula-
tions and introducing security controls. The risk levels were calculated before and after the security
controls were applied. The following problems were considered:
1. What are the security requirements for the Estonian e-health infrastructure? – It was found
that with R1 and R2 the security requirement was to monitor and log the activity in the MSP  net-
work and personal computers. In the case of R3 and R4 the integrity of the EHR should be ensured
when it is compiled by the GP. 2. What kind of security controls can be implemented to fulfil
the security requirements? – Security control in the case of R1 is to use secured connections and
encryption of the database for patient registration auditing database queries logs. For R2, stronger
passwords or smart cards should be used for authentication. In the case of R3 the digital signature,
e-seal or KSI time stamp should be used on creating the EHR. In the case of R4 the received EHR
should be verified with the previous original received, for example, by using Blockchain crypto-
graphic digest.  3.  What security controls should be applied in order to fulfil the security re-
quirements for integrity, availability and confidentiality set on the NHIS by the law? – It is
necessary to use secured connections and encryption of the database for patient registration auditing
database queries logs. The MSP workers should have stronger passwords or  use smart cards for au-
thentication, and use the digital signature, e-seal or KSI time stamp when compiling the EHR. The
received EHR should also be verified  with the original received. For this purpose, for example,
Blockchain cryptographic digest can be used.
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6 Survey and Validation 
In this thesis I described the present situation of the Estonian e-health infrastructure, defined the
parties who are playing an important role in that infrastructure, analysed the usage of the digital
signature with EHRs and considered the role of ISKE and information exchange. Next I discussed
four  business  assets:  registered  patient  personal  information,  patient  health  information,  EHR
information created by the GP and EHR information created by the MSP. Then I made risk analysis
of assets  using the ISSRM Domain Model,  where I  brought  out  threat  agents,  attack methods,
vulnerabilities and impact, and also discussed risk mitigation, risk assessment and security control
selection.
In the last step I made a survey to validate the correctness of my findings. The process and results of
the survey are presented below.
6.1 Problem Statement
Proceeding from my research questions, I defined risk and conducted a survey in order to assess the
likelihood of the risks. The results of the survey are used to validate the correctness of my findings
and to show how big is the deviation between my results and expert opinions.
6.2 Development and Testing of the Questionnaire
When participants in interviews were defined and the design of the questionnaire was completed,
the planning and setup of interviews were finished. A personal invitation was sent to each intervie-
wee. The schedule of the interviews depended on the availability of time. The interviews were con-
ducted in office meeting rooms without disruption. 
The target audience for the survey was selected from the specialists working with the Estonian e-
health  infrastructure.  Out  of  the  large  number  tools  available  for  making  the  survey,  I  chose
Surveymonkey that fitted best with my thesis. In my research the correctness of the survey is  much
more important than statistical analysis, because due to the small number of experts in that area, it is
impossible to get statistical data for analysis.
Three versions of the questionnaire were tested over the time frame from December 2017 until
March 2018. The final version was developed based on the interviews that were documented.
Several interviews were conducted in December 2017 with the representatives from the Estonian e-
health infrastructure. The Chief Security officer at the HWISC, Mr. Urmo Laaneots gave a valuable
feedback on my questionnaire. 
6.3 Results and Observations from Interviews
Hereby I discuss the results obtained from the interviews and the process of analysing these results.
All information collected from the interviews was documented in the best way possible. The inter-
views were conducted face to face. I made audio recordings and transcripts of all verbal communi-
cation and data obtained from notes. The whole set of information was compiled soon after the in-
terview was finished, to ensure that all feelings and information were fresh and emotions were not
forgotten. 
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The correctness of answers is the most important part of interviews. In order to achieve it, the fol-
lowing issues should be taken into account.
• Questionnaire problems: The proper design of the questionnaire requires a large amount of
background work. We can try to mitigate this problem but it is impossible to eliminate it.
The questions must be worded with utmost care so that all persons would understand them
in the same way.
• Questionnaire length: The questionnaire must be short and very clear. There must be a bal-
ance between time and the number of questions.
• Question-order effect: Randomizing questions are not working in software engineering; in-
stead, logical adherence must be used. The questions must be asked in logical order, which
helps categorizing the data.
• Time limitation:  This problem is common with e-mail-based questionnaires when we are
unable to get an answer in the right time cycle. 
• Domain knowledge: I tried to resolve this problem by choosing experienced persons to an-
swer the questionnaire, involving experts in the study area. 
6.4 Presentation of Main Results
The main audience of my study consists of experts in e-health cyber security. The five persons who
participated in the interviews are highly educated and also experienced in that area. Figure 11 shows
that two interviewees have been engaged in e-health cyber security for more than 7 years, two up to
3 years and one participant has been working in that field for 5–7 years.
The educational level of the participants in the interviews varied as well: one has a master’s degree,
three have a bachelor’s degree and one has no academic degree (Figure 12). All of them have been
working in this industry for a long time and are thus highly experienced. 
38
 
Figure 11: Working experience.
 6.5 Ensuring the Integrity of EHRs
The main question of my thesis is how to ensure the integrity of EHRs in the Estonian e-health in-
frastructure. Is it  enough that the HWISC adds an e-seal to every EHR issued by GPs, without
checking the data in the EHR? To resolve this problem, I conducted a survey and asked experts to
answer the following five questions.
The first question is related to business asset 1: 
• How likely will the confidentiality of registered patient information be compromised by the
hacker in the IS of the MSP?
The process behind this question includes the registration of patient data by the MSP registrar and
the business asset – registered patient personal information, also patient registration in the MSP. The
opinions of the experts varied: one expert considered it very likely that somebody could change the
EHR in the MSP’s IS, one expert considered it potentially likely and three experts said it was poten-
tially not likely (Figure 13). 
The second question is related to business asset 2: 
• How likely  will  the  EHR be compromised inside  the  IS  of  the  MSP by another  MSP
worker? 
The process involved starts with clinical observation of the patient and finishes with creating the
EHR information by the GP and transferring it to the NHIS. As I stated earlier, EHR integrity is not
ensured when the document is left digitally unsigned by the GP. This triggered my second question.
One of the experts answered that such a possibility was potentially likely and four experts consid-
ered such a possibility potentially not likely (Figure 14). A hacker able to perform this kind of attack
must have very high know-how and excellent technical equipment.   
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Figure 12: Educational level.
The third question is related to business asset 3: 
• How likely will the EHR become compromised during the transfer from the MSP infrastruc-
ture to the HWISC infrastructure?
After the patient has visited the GP and the GP has compiled the EHR, the following assets lie in the
exchange of data between the MSP and NHIS.  Three experts considered the possibility that the
EHR becomes compromised during its transfer potentially likely and two experts considered it po-
tentially not likely (Figure 15).
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Figure 13: The likelihood that the integrity of the EHR will be compromised by the
hacker in the MSP’s IS.
Figure 14: The likelihood that the integrity of the EHR will be compromised inside the
MSP’s IS.
Potentially
likely
The fourth question is related to business asset 4:
• How likely will the EHR become compromised before it is digitally signed in the MSP in-
frastructure prior to transfer to the HWISC infrastructure?
Medical service providers use their own ISs into which doctors insert the data contained in EHRs
provided by them. Before the EHRs are sent to the NHIS, they are digitally signed in the MSP’s IS
using the MSP’s e-seal. According to one expert the possibility that the EHR becomes compromised
is very likely, three experts considered it potentially likely and one expert answered that it was po-
tentially not likely (Figure 16).
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Figure 15: The likelihood of the EHR becoming compromised during the transfer from
the MSP infrastructure to the HWISC infrastructure.
Figure 16:  The likelihood that the EHR becomes compromised before
it is digitally signed in the MSP infrastructure prior to transfer to the
HWISC infrastructure.
The aim of the fifth question was to find out which is the best means of ensuring the integrity of
EHRs – the personal digital signature of the GP or the organization’s e-seal of the HWISC.
• Where should the digital signature be put on the EHR?
In my opinion the digital signature must be added to an EHR as close to its source as possible. I got
three almost similar results: two experts answered that the GP must add the digital signature to the
EHR, one expert said that the MSP could put the organization’s e-seal on the EHR and two experts
answered that the timestamp added by the IS of the GP was good as well (Figure 17).
6.6 Threats to Validity
When validating the accuracy of the results, I used my best knowledge and technologies. Validation
by some other approach or by using different technologies, however, may give a different outcome.
My conclusions were mainly based on the survey performed by me and potentially I could miss
some concepts from the comparison of the answers. The Estonian e-health infrastructure must guar-
antee the integrity and confidentiality of EHRs, by taking many security requirements into account.
A major problem is that persons who are responsible for the security are changing very often. 
6.7 Summary
In this chapter I found answers to the five questions contained in my questionnaire. The intervie-
wees are highly experienced in e-health industry, whereas the majority of them have also good edu-
cational background. 
The  first question was: How likely will the confidentiality of registered patient information be
compromised by the hacker in the IS of the MSP? One expert answered that very likely the EHR
could be modified, one expert considered this possibility potentially likely and three experts said it
was potentially not likely.
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Figure 17: Places of adding the digital signature to the EHR. 
The second question was: How likely will the EHR be compromised inside the IS of the MSP by
another MSP worker? One of the experts considered such a possibility potentially likely and four
experts thought it was potentially not likely. In order to make such attack, the hacker must have very
high know-how and excellent technical equipment.
The third question was: How likely will the EHR become compromised during the transfer from
the MSP infrastructure to the HWISC infrastructure? Three experts considered it potentially likely
and two experts thought it was potentially not likely. 
The  fourth question was: How likely will the EHR become compromised before it is digitally
signed in the MSP infrastructure prior to transfer to the HWISC infrastructure? One expert consid-
ered such a possibility very likely, three experts potentially likely and one expert potentially not
likely.
The fifth question was: Where should the digital signature be put on the EHR? In my opinion it
should be done as close to the source of the EHR as possible. The answers of the experts were quite
similar: two experts answered that the GP must digitally sign the EHR, one expert thinks that the
MSP can put the organization’s e-seal on the EHR and two experts think that the timestamp added
by the IS of the GP can also be used.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this master’s thesis the security issues affecting the Estonian e-health infrastructure are analysed.
The Estonian e-health infrastructure is a very good example about different organizations trying to
collaborate and keep the integrity and confidentiality of patient medical data on a high level. The
analysis performed in this study shows that adding an e-seal to EHRs by the NHIS poses great secu-
rity risks. Due to the adoption of such a decision, the EHR integrity is not ensured on the highest
level and the data in thousands of EHRs are of very low credibility. 
During the compilation of this thesis I studied alternative ways of digitally signing medical docu-
ments. The main conclusion is that everywhere documents are provided by an e-signature, e-seal or
timestamp close to the GP who has created the respective medical document. Such an approach en-
ables avoiding any external modifications to the documents containing confidential data of people.
However, different approaches could be noticed as to who owns the medical data – the patient, the
doctor or the state. Different views were also found concerning the measures, and their costs, that
should be taken to ensure the initial integrity of an EHR and avoid compromising it during transfer
from one institution to another. The essential issue to be resolved by implementing security mea-
sures is to avoid making false decisions about patient’s treatment resulting from the modification of
information during the exchange of health data from one MSP to another through the NHIS. 
The analysis is based on processes in the Estonian e-health infrastructure. The business and infor-
mation system assets involved in these processes were identified, including registered patient per-
sonal information, GP compiling patient health information, EHR information transfer to the NHIS
and transfer of EHR information from the MSP to the NHIS. 
The final chapter of the thesis provides a summary of this research. It presents limitations of the
research, answers to the research questions and a discussion about future work.
7.1 Limitations
Electronic health records have been used for quite a long time, but it is difficult to find papers deal-
ing with EHRs and security. Papers originating from the 1990s are available, but they are out of
date today because technology is changing rapidly. For that reason I used lots of material from the
Internet and white papers. The survey validation is based on the literature and technologies used in
this thesis. Another validation approach, however, may give different results.
The external validity of the present research lies in its applicability in everyday e-health practice.
The outcomes of the thesis are valid for the Estonian e-health infrastructure, but with respective
changes according to the local context are usable also in other countries. 
The reliability of materials used in the thesis adds to its quality. My thesis is validated by literary
sources, previous studies in the same field and interviews with the experts. Some limitations arose
from surveys because it appeared impossible to get answers from all participants and find literature
coverage.
7.2 Answers to Research Questions
The main research question of this thesis was: How to guarantee the integrity of the EHR business
process? In order to find an answer to this question, three sub-research questions concentrating on
different aspects of the current situation in the Estonian e-health infrastructure were analysed.  
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First, the assets present in the Estonian e-health infrastructure were brought out. The business assets
comprise registered patient personal information, patient health information and EHR information,
which are suppplemented by different IS assets (e.g. patient, MSP network, infrastrusture, digital
signature, sending patient health information). Seven organizations having different responsibilities
were determined in the Estonian e-health infrastructure: patients, GP, doctor, MSP, MHIS, medical
software developer and Ministry of Social Affairs. Medical services are provided by large hospitals
as well as small centres of GPs which use different IT solutions and ISs: those developed by differ-
ent companies, X-Road infrastructure, portals managed by the HWISC and the NHIS database man-
aged by the HWISC. Medical service providers send data to the NHIS and also receive data via the
data exchange layer X-Road. The EHRs compiled by doctors using the MSP’s IS are sent over the
X-Road infrastructure to the NHIS database, where all needed validation and controls are done. 
Second, the assessment of risks of assets in the Estonian e-health infrastructure was analysed. Two
possible threat agents, a hacker and another MSP worker were defined, who can use different attack
methods. A hacker may access the network or MSP computers through the man-in-the-middle attack
or by taking advantage of the weakness in the MSP’s health IS and change the EHR or the EHR is
changed before the MSP adds the e-seal to it.  An MSP worker can either change patient health
information and the diagnosisnor send changed patient health information to the NHIS. All this
poses risks to the organizations involved: loss of the confidentiality of patient information or theft
of patient information, loss of the integrity of patient health information, negation of the integrity of
the EHR and loss of trust in the MSP.  
Third,  the ways of mitigating risks in the Estonian e-health infrastructure were discussed.  Four
types  of  risks  (R1–R4)  are  present in  the  Estonian  e-health  infrastructure:  R1 is  related to  the
registered patient personal information asset, R2 to the patient health information asset, R3 to the
EHR information asset (created by the GP), R4 to the EHR information asset (created by the MSP).
Different security requirements apply to different risks: with R1 and R2 the activity in the MSP
network and computers must be monitored and logged; with R3 and R4 the integrity of the EHR
must be secured when it is created by the GP. 
In order to fulfil these security requirements, various security controls can be implemented. For R1
secured connections and encryption of the database should be used for patient registration auditing
database  queries  logs.  For  R2  stronger  passwords  or  smart  cards  should  be  employed  for
authentication. In the case of R3 the digital signature, e-seal or KSI timestamp need to be used on
compiling the EHR. In the case of R4 the received EHR must be verified with the previous original
received, by using for example Blockchain cryptographic digest.
To meet the security requirements for integrity, availability and confidentiality set on the NHIS by
the law the following security controls should be applied. It is necessary to use secured connections
and encryption of the database for patient registration auditing database queries logs. The MSP
workers should use stronger passwords or smart cards for authentication.  The digital  signature,
digital seal or KSI time stamp should be employed when the EHR is compiled. The received EHR
should be verified with the original received (for example with Blockchain cryptographic digest).
7.3 Future Work and Author’s Proposals
This research is based on the organization of the work at the Estonian e-health infrastructure. The
aim of the analysis was to find out in which point of the infrastructure the integrity of the EHR must
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be ensured. This case develops very rapidly with time: the technologies that are on a high level to-
day may not be so secure in near future. I expect that this work opens up more studies in the in -
tegrity in e-health. There are many different opinions concerning the ways of ensuring the integrity
of data and hopefully there will be more works on how to use them in the e-health infrastructure. 
In my work I analysed security threats occurring in the Estonian e-health infrastructure. At present
more cloud infrastructure is increasingly added to the e-health infrastructure and organizations over
Europe are (and will be) changing cross-border e-health information. Therefore I suggest that IS-
SRM Domain Models should be applied in analysing security threats in hybrid environments that
are laid over borders.
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